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FIRST AMENDMENT-LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT
AND DISCLOSURE

ACT--SECTION

REPORTING

101(a)(4)-EMPLOYER-FUNDED

SUITS-The United States District Court for the District of Colum-

bia has held that precluding employers and employer associations
from financing suits brought by employees against their unions violates the employer's or employer association's freedom of association and speech, and right to petition.
UA W v.National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education
Foundation, 433 F. Supp. 474 (D.D.C. 1977).
In 1973, the International Union of Automobile Workers (UAW)
and nine other unions sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
damages in the District Court for the District of Columbia against
the National Right to Work Committee and National Right to Work
Legal Defense and Education Foundation (Foundation).' The UAW
alleged that the Foundation was a conduit through which interested
employers were financing and supporting legal actions brought by
workers against the plaintiff unions in violation of section 101(a)(4)
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA), 2 prohibiting employer interference in employee suits
against unions. The Foundation filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that no private right of
action was created by this section of the LMRDA.a Holding the
1. UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Foundation, 366 F. Supp.
46 (D.D.C. 1974).
2. Id. at 47. Section 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action
in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of
whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding . . .And provided further, that no interested
employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or
participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petit ion.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 101].
In addition to the § 101 cause of action, the UAW sought to have the Foundation file reports
pursuant to § 203(b)(1) of the LMRDA. This section provides that every person who, pursuant
to an arrangement with an employer, undertakes to persuade employees on whether or not
to exercise their right to organize and bargain collectively, or affect the manner of exercising
that right, shall file a detailed statement of the terms and conditions of the arrangement with
the Secretary of Labor. Included in this statement will be receipts from employers and
disbursements of any kind. 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(1) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section
2031.
3. 366 F. Supp. at 47. The court also considered this motion in regard to the filing of
reports under § 203. Id. The court held that the private litigant (UAW) could invoke the
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unions to be aggrieved persons within the meaning of section 102 of
the LMRDA, 4 the court concluded that the UAW had standing to
bring the section 101 suit.'
Subsequently, the UAW brought a motion to compel interrogatories, which Judge Richey granted on June 5, 1974 in his second
opinion in this case.' The Foundation had attempted to resist the
motion. First, it argued that the "no employer interference" proviso
to section 101 applied only to those actions where the employee's
suit against the union was violative of the employee rights under
section 101 of the LMRDA.7 Second, it asserted that section 101 did
not preclude interested employer financing where the employee was
suing the union on non-title I sections of the LMRDA since such
preclusion would violate section 103 of the LMRDA. s The court
dismissed the Foundation's first assertion on the basis of the clear,
unambiguous language of the act 9 and case law construing it.", Findjurisdiction of the court since the district courts had original jurisdiction of any action arising
under any act of Congress that regulates commerce (28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970)), and the purpose
of this act was to prevent or eliminate improper practices that burden or obstruct commerce
(29 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1970)). 366 F. Supp. at 50. The court later reversed itself on this issue.
See UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Foundation, 433 F. Supp. 474,
484 (D.D.C. 1977), where, after examining supplemental briefs, it was concluded that only
the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to § 210 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 440 (1970), may bring
a civil action to enforce the reporting requirements. Section 210 provides: "Whenever it shall
appear that any person has violated. . . the provisions of this subchapter, the Secretary may
bring a civil action for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate . . . " Id.
4. 366 F. Supp. at 48. Section 102 of the LMRDA provides that any person (the term
person includes labor organizations, as provided in § 3(d) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 402(d)
(1970)) whose rights are secured by the provisions may bring an action in a United States
district court for appropriate relief. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
5. 366 F. Supp. at 49.
6. UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Foundation, 376 F. Supp.
1060 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. Id. at 1061. Section 101 of the LMRDA guarantees the employee equal rights, freedom
of speech and assembly, stability of dues, protection of their right to sue, and safeguards
against improper disciplinary action. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as title

II.

8. 376 F. Supp. at 1063-64. Section 103 of the LMRDA provides: "Nothing contained in
this subchapter shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization
under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution
and by-laws of any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
section 103].
9. 376 F. Supp. at 1062. The court pointed out that § 101 applied to "an action in any
court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency" and that the proviso in question
precluded financing by employers in "any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition."
See note 2 supra.
10. Id. at 1062-63. The court relied on NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), and Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C Cir. 1965). The
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ing that the Foundation had misconceived the purpose of section
103 of the LMRDA, the court also dismissed the second assertion."
Upon the grant of the UAW's motion to compel the interrogatories, 2 the Foundation petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for a stay and a mandamus to vacate the order
compelling discovery and to dismiss the section 101 cause of action
either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or because of the unconstitutionality of the second proviso of section 101."1 The stay was
granted, 4 but the court of appeals was unable to reach the merits
of the mandamus petition on the record before it. Since the Foundation claimed to be a neutral group, within the meaning of NAACP
v. Button,"' rather than a front for interested employers, and thus
not subject to the provisions of section 101, the determination of
what type of organization the Foundation was in fact had to precede
any consideration of the constitutional question. The case was
6
therefore remanded to the trial court.1
Supreme Court in Marine & Ship Workers concluded that this first proviso to § 101(a)(4),
which required the union member to exhaust reasonable internal procedures before instituting legal action, gave the NLRB the discretion for four months not to hear an unfair labor
charge filed by the employee against the union while the union member sought internal relief.
In Roberts, the court of appeals held that this proviso did not preclude the NLRB from
exercising its powers under the National Labor Relations Act. But it did authorize the Board
to withhold exercise of their authority for four months if reasonable internal procedures had
not been exhausted by the union member in his unfair labor practice charge against the
union. Although these two cases dealt with the scope of the first proviso of section 101 and
not with the second, which was in question in UAW, the cases, by applying this proviso to
unfair labor practice charges, indicate that section 101 is not limited to employee suits against
the union for violation of employee rights under § 101 of the LMRDA. 376 F. Supp. at 1062.
11. The purpose of section 103, which provides that nothing in the LMRDA shall limit
an employee's rights or remedies under any law, before any court, or under any constitution
or by-laws of a labor organization, was to preserve generally employee rights of action under
the NLRA. It cannot preserve a right to employer financing since employers have never been
under an obligation to pay for employee suits against the unions. 376 F. Supp. at 1064.
12. The UAW sought information as to the amounts contributed to the Foundation by
116 persons listed on its business advisory committee, the names of the 37 companies who
gave more than five hundred dollars in 1972, and the names of 37 companies drawn at random
from those contributing between one hundred and five hundred dollars in 1972. See National
Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Foundation v. Richey, 510 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975).
13. Id. The Foundation claimed the section violated its freedom of speech and association
and its right of petition.
14. Id.
15. 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (to preclude the NAACP by statute from supplying NAACP staff
attorneys to private litigants in desegragation actions would be a violation of the NAACP's
first amendment rights). See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
16. 510 F.2d at 1243.
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Because the Foundation continued to disobey discovery orders,
Judge Richey invoked-rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 7 which in effect established the Foundation as an association funded by employers to promote employer interests,'" an
interested rather than a neutral group. The UAW thereupon filed
motions for interlocutory summary judgment and preliminary injunction.'5 The Foundation counterclaimed by renewing its contention that the proviso to section 101(a)(4) was unconstitutional in
that it infringed on its first amendment rights. " In his final opinion,
issued on June 2, 1977,2! Judge Richey considered these motions in
relation to the section 101 cause of action originally filed by the
UAW on October 24, 1973.22 After first concluding that the UAW
had established a section 101 violation by the Foundation, 2 :' the
district court held that by precluding the financing of employee
suits against unions, the section 101 proviso violated the Foundation's first amendment rights.
In his analysis, Judge Richey initially acknowledged the directive
of the court of appeals that the constitutional issues could not be
decided until the organizational nature of the Foundation was determined, 2' but concluded that, with the rule 37 order, sufficient
facts were established by the entire record to allow him to view the
Foundation as an interested employer association and thereby proceed to adjudicate the constitutional counterclaim defense. 2 , Judge
Richey thus considered whether there were any infringements on the
Foundation's first amendment rights. Under the facts, the Founda17. UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Foundation, No. 783-73
(D.D.C., Jan. 26, 1976). When a party refuses to comply with a court order compelling
discovery, the court can make another order. This second order establishes the matters, which
were to be answered by the first order, in favor of the party obtaining the order. FED. R. Civ.
P. 37(b)(2)(A) [hereinafter referred to as rule 371. The rule 37 order was entered because of
the Foundation's willful failures to comply with the discovery order.
18. 433 F. Supp. at 480-81.
19. Id. at 478.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 477.
22. Id. at 478. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
23. It was undisputed that the Foundation had funded at least one union member in the
litigation against his labor organization and that the suits were "actions in any court" within
the meaning of § 101(a). The UAW had only to prove that the Foundation was an "interested
employer or employer association" within the. meaning of the statute and this, the court
concluded, was established by the rule 37 order. 433 F. Supp. at 480-81.
24. 433 F. Supp. at 481.
25. Id.
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tion was an association supporting employee litigation against unions and could not bring actions on its own. The court recognized
that under CaliforniaMotor TransportCo. v. Trucking Unlimited,2"
the right of access to the courts is included in the right of petition,
and therefore held section 101 violative of the Foundation's right.
Relying on Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,27 where the court
determined that an individual's freedom to associate for the advancement of beliefs was protected by the first amendment, and
NAACP v. Button,2" where it was stated that association for litigation may be the most effective form of policial association, the court
concluded there was also infringement on the Foundation's right of
association and speech."
But the first amendment is not an absolute prohibition of state
infringement. The court agreed with the UAW that a sufficiently
compelling state interest would justify infringement as long as the
means chosen to effectuate that state interest minimized possible
infringement; thus, the court balanced the infringement against the
asserted compelling state interests. 0 The court reasoned that the
interests in the prevention of interference by employers in the relations between unions and their members, and the prevention of
26. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Plaintiff and defendant were competitive highway carriers. Defendant conspired to monopolize trade and commerce in the transport of goods by instituting
state and federal proceedings designed to defeat plaintiff's transporting rights. The Supreme
Court held that although the right of access to the courts is included in the right of petition,
the first amendment would not under the facts preclude application of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.
27. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, one of the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement required nonunion teachers to pay a service charge to the union equal to regular
dues required of union members. The nonunion teachers argued, and the Court agreed, that
this violated their right of freedom of association "because they have been prohibited not from
actively participating, but rather from refusing to associate." Id. at 234.
28. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For a discussion of the case, see note 52 and accompanying text
infra.
29. 433 F. Supp. at 482.
30. Id. The basis for the court's balancing test was Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(19771 and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Wooley, the state claimed two interests in
requiring a state motto to be displayed on license plates. The first was facilitating the identification of passenger vehicles and the second was promoting the appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride. The Court held that neither of these were sufficiently compelling
to justify infringement of first amendment rights. The Buckley. Court held that the governmental interest in preventing the corruption spawned by the coercive influence of large
financial campaign contributions was sufficiently compelling to validate the contribution
restrictions of the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 608(b}(1)-(3) (Supp.
V 1975), and was closely drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement. See 424 U.S. at 25, 2829.
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employer abuse of section 101(a)(4) rights, were not sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the infringement on the Foundation's first
amendment freedoms." Therefore, the section 101 proviso was unconstitutional. Additionally, even if the UAW could offer sufficiently compelling interests to permit some abridgement of first
amendment rights, the rule of Shelton v. Tucker :2 permitted infringement by a statute only if the statute is drawn to impose the
slightest degree of infringement possible. The court concluded that
the section 101 proviso would still be unconstitutional due to its
indiscriminate broadness. 3
UA W represents a departure from the traditional attitude of the
courts toward labor relations.3 4 The LMRDA, one of the many national labor laws, 35 reaffirmed the national labor relations policy of
favoring collective bargaining and the maintenance of a free flow of
commerce.: " It was enacted by Congress to ensure the observance of
31. 433 F. Supp. at 483.
32. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, an Arkansas statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1229
(1960), required a teacher to file an annual report of every organization to which he had
belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. The Court stated:
The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now before us brings it within
the ban of our prior cases. The statute's comprehensive interference with associational
freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers.
364 U.S. at 490.
33. 433 F. Supp. at 483. See also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). In Kusper, a voter was barred from voting in a Democratic
primary for state and federal offices because she had voted in a Republican city primary
within the preceding twenty-three months. This twenty-three month rule was a provision of
the Illinois Election Code, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-43(d) (Smith-Hurd 1965). The Court
held the statute unconstitutional. The state interest against raiding, whereby voters in sympathy with one party vote in another party's primary to distort the result, could be controlled
by less drastic means. Robel dealt with § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1970), which provides that when a communist-action
organization is under final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of the
organization "to engage in any employment in any defense facility." The defendant, who was
charged with violating the act, claimed that it violated his first amendment rights. The Court
agreed; the statute held a person guilty for being a member of an organization without a
showing that the organization posed a threat to our government.
34. See Bond, The NLRA and the Forgotten First Amendment, 28 S.C.L. REV. 421, 421
(1977), for a discussion of the protective role taken by the courts towards unions.
35. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, 1977 GUIDEBOOK TO LABOR RELATIONS 20-21 (17th ed. 1977)
[hereinafter referred to as GUIDEBOOKI. Our national labor policy has its roots in the Railway
Labor Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley
Act, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Id. at 19-21 (discussion of the purposes of these acts).
36. Id. at 21.
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high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct on the part of
both employers and unions in administering the affairs of their organizations. Furthermore, the proviso to section 101 was specifically
directed to the impropriety of interested employers or employer
associations financing suits in which they were not a party."
In holding this proviso to be in conflict with the Constitution, the
court veered from the direction seemingly set for it by the court of
appeals. The court of appeals viewed the Foundation's argument as
resting on its claim that it was a neutral group. 3 Implicit in the issue
as framed by the court of appeals-whether the Foundation met the
neutrality test-was the premise that Congress could constitutionally preclude financing by an interested employer association. 9 Had
Judge Richey followed the appeals court's assumption, he would
have dismissed the Foundation's counterclaim upon finding that
the Foundation was an interested employer association. The district
court, however, upon concluding that the Foundation had the status
of an interested employer association, proceeded to balance the infringement on the Foundation's first amendment freedoms against
the "compelling interests" suggested by the UAW and found the
latter to be inadequate.
The analysis of the district court in concluding that prevention
of employer interference was not sufficiently compelling to justify
the infringement appears to be deficient in two respects. First, employer interference in affairs between an employee and his union is
contrary to established statutory and judicial labor policy. Statutes
implementing this principle began with the Erdman Act of 1898,1"
and continued with the Railway Labor Act of 1926," the Norris37. 99 CONG. REC. 2988 (1959). Republicans and Democrats agreed that, overall, the § 101
proviso was a good provision. The debate was over whether any employer, interested or not,
should be precluded from financing the suit. Id.
38. 510 F.2d at 1243.
39. Id. The court stated:
We do not understand petitioners to argue that Congress may not prohibit direct
financing by an interested employer through a sham or cover entity. Their argument
rather must rest on their assertion that they are a neutral body, and the constitutional
question they present thus cannot be decided without a determination of what type of
organization the Foundation is in fact.

Id.
40. Erdman Act, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424 (1899) (repealed 38 Stat. 108 (1915)) (yellow
dog contract was outlawed).
41. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970) (employee rights of self-organization were assured without
employer interference).
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LaGuardia Act,42 the National Labor Relations Act,43 and the Taft
Hartley amendments." There is also a myriad of cases that barred
employer interference. For example, the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act were upheld against constitutional attack in Texas &
New Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks,4" where the Court held that the employer had no right to
interfere with the employee's choice of union representation.
InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. NLRB45 emphasized the
NLRA's policy to free collective bargaining from employer influence. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,47 the Court held that an employer's first amendment right to communicate his views did not
outweigh an employee's rights to associate freely as provided by the
NLRA. Thus, by concluding that employer interference was not
sufficiently compelling, the district court ignored the labor relations
policy that has been developed by our legislative and judicial systems.
The second deficiency in the court's balancing test was its failure
to consider the Foundation's purpose in financing the suits. It is
certainly arguable that the Foundation's purpose was simply to use
the suit as a sham device to decrease union power by harassing
unions and lowering union esteem in the eyes of the employees."
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970) (assured against employer intrusion in union affairs but
failed to provide positive measures with respect to those matters).
43. 29 U.S.C. §j 151-167 (1970) (provided positive protection for employee self-organization against employer interference through the use of an unfair labor practice proceeding).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970) (forbade employers giving money to a union).
45. 281 U.S. 548 (1930). The defendant railroad company promoted the Association of
Clerical Employees-Southern Pacific Lines in opposition to the plaintiff, Brotherhood of
Railway & Steamship Clerks, which had been previously authorized by a majority of the
company's railway clerks. The activities constituted an interference with the liberty of the
clerical employees in selecting representatives for the purposes set forth in the Railway Labor
Act.
46. 311 U.S. 72 (1940). The Supreme Court set aside a collective bargaining agreement
due to various unfair labor practices committed by an employer in his attempts to aid the
union's organizational drive.
47. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). To counter a union's organizational campaign, the employer sent
out various publications to his employees. Because these publications were threatening and
not factual, the Supreme Court concluded that the employer committed an unfair labor
practice.
48. Because the Foundation never disclosed the purposes of its contributors (which subsequently led to the rule 37 sanction), this is only a presumption. Judge Richey admitted that
the "proviso serves to protect unions from harassing litigation and illegal management interference with their internal disputes with dissident workers." 366 F. Supp. at 48. See Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 871
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This would not have been the first time a court was faced with a
sham device disguised as a first amendment claim. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 9 the Supreme Court considered the truckers' contentions that while a publicity campaign appeared to be directed toward persuading a Pennsylvania governor to veto a so-called "fair truck" bill, it was actually
an attempt by the railroads to hurt the trucking industry as a whole
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Although the Supreme
Court held the campaign to be legitimate, it stated that there could
be situations where a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to hurt competitors and that the first amendment would not prevent the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act in those cases.50 Similarly, in
CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited," it was held
that the first amendment does not insulate an industry's use of the
judicial system from federal antitrust prohibitions, where the purported attempt to influence the government through the judicial
system was a mere sham to hinder competitors. The Noerr dictum
and Trucking Unlimited are extremely persuasive, for if Congress
could constitutionally infringe on first amendment rights and prohibit employers from harassing competitors, it could also prohibit
employers from harassing unions.
The court relied on Button52 to support the proposition that association for litigation may be the most effective form of political
association, but ignored the basic distinction the court of appeals
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Aaron], where it was stated that the purpose of the proviso was
to prevent union members from "fronting" for attacking employers.
49. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970) for the applicable provisions of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
50. 365 U.S. at 144.
51. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
52. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the NAACP was concentrating upon financing litigation aimed at ending racial segregation in the public schools of Virginia. At NAACP meetings,
one of the NAACP attorneys would explain what was legally necessary to fight desegregation
and on occasion would pass around blank forms seeking to encourage citizens to file actions,
which would be financed by the NAACP against the school boards. In 1956, the Virginia
legislature added chapter 33 to the Virginia Code, VA. CODE §§ 54-74, -78, -79 (1974), which
forbade the solicitation of legal business by a "runner" or "capper". Chapter 33 defined
"runner" or "capper" to include "an agent for an individual or organization which retains
an attorney in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has no
pecuniary right or liability." Despite the state's interest in regulating professional conduct,
the Court held chapter 33 to be violative of the NAACP's right of petition, speech, and
association. 371 U.S. at 430.
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highlighted between a neutral group and an interested employer. 3
In Button, solicitation and litigation were held to be forms of political expression, the means to obtaining the end of racial desegregation.5 4 In contrast, the Foundation-supported litigation served no
political ends, only the employer's own selfish end of decreasing the
unions' power15 by forcing them into harassing litigation and interfering with internal union disputes. Moreover, in Button, a possible
conflict of interests between the interest group (NAACP) and the
individual plaintiff was unlikely since the individual and the
NAACP were both seeking racial desegregation. In UA W, however,
a conflict of interests between the interest group (Foundation) and
the individual plaintiff was more probable. The individual is only
concerned with his own personal claim, whereas the Foundation is
seeking the overall effect of interfering with the union through individual law suits. Because an individual may have a weak case, he
may be better off by accepting an out-of-court compromise rather
than attempting to achieve a more substantial sum at trial.5" Because this type of compromise would frustrate the attainment of the
Foundation's goals, the Foundation attorney representing the employee might not make the employee aware of his alternative.57
Finally, the statute is not as broad as Judge Richey construed it."5
The legislature never intended to prevent all employers from getting
into court. If the employer or employer association is a party to the
action, the proviso is inapplicable. Moreover, only "interested"
employers 9 are within the proviso's limitations. Personal friends or
banks who are incidental employers are not so precluded from financing suits. 0 These factors, combined with the many Supreme
Court decisions holding the public welfare to be a sufficiently compelling interest to justify infringement on first amendment rights by
53. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
54. 371 U.S. at 430.
55. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
56. See Birkby & Murphy, Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena: The First
Amendment and Group Access to the Courts, 42 Tax. L. REv. 1018, 1036-37 (1964), for a
discussion of interest group litigation.
57. Id. at 1036.
58. 433 F. Supp. at 483. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
59. See Aaron, supra note 48, at 871-72, for a discussion of the problem that is created by
use of the phrase "interested employer."
60. See 105 CONG. Rac. 6724-25 (1959), where the Senate discussed the proviso's effect if
the word "interested" were not included in the phrase "interested employer or employer
association."
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statutes worded equally as broad,' undercut the persuasiveness of
Judge Richey's opinion.
The decision to allow any interested employer or employer association to fund litigation brought by employees against their unions
may have several undesirable effects. First, it may result in a flood
of litigation. Since the suit will be financed by the employer, the
employee will not need to consider the likelihood of winning or the
relation between the potential recovery and his court costs and attorney fees. He will merely bring the suit and hope that its outcome
is favorable. Second, it may result in abuses of our judicial process.
If an employee has a disagreement with his union or is no longer
supportive of it, he may file a suit with no legal basis merely as a
form of retaliation against the union. Yet, in spite of these undesirable effects, the district court departed from the protective role
courts have taken towards unions.2 The court of appeals"' and other
courts which might be faced with this problem in the future should
not support this departure. If an employee wants to bring an action
against the union, it must be his decision, and his decision alone.
To permit the employer to intervene threatens the industrial peace
that underlies our labor policy. 4
David A. Ricchuito
61. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U.S. 63 (1928). In Communist Party, § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50
U.S.C. § 792(a) (1970), was held constitutional. Protection of the public welfare was held to
be sufficiently compelling to justify the registration of communist groups with the Secretary
of State. In Burroughs, the protection of the public against corruption was sufficiently compelling to permit the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-245 (1970), to require
all political committees to file the names of all contributors with the Clerk of the House of
Representatives. Because protection of the public welfare was a sufficiently compelling interest, the Bryant Court upheld a state statute, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 53 (McKinney 1976),
that required the Ku Klux Klan to register with the Secretary of State.
62. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
63. The case is pending before the court of appeals. UAW v. National Right to Work Legal
Defense and Educ. Foundation, Nos. 77-1739, 77-1766, 77-1767 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 1977).
64. See GUIDEBOOK, supra note 35, at 21.

